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RESPONSE 
THOUGHTS ON TREATING UNION REPRESENTATION 
PROCESSES AS A MARKET IN NEED OF LEGALLY 
REQUIRED DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION 
Catherine L. Fisk* 
MAGINE a market that looks like this. You’re thinking of buy-
ing something—a house, insurance, shares of stock, a prescrip-
tion drug, or a medical procedure. There is an entity (call it the 
“anti-seller”) that considers it in its economic interest that you not 
buy the item. The anti-seller has a great deal of money and all of 
your working hours to persuade you not to buy. The anti-seller 
hires lawyers and consultants to run a campaign to block the sale. 
The consultants require your supervisor at work to meet with you 
daily in one-on-one meetings to tell you why you shouldn’t buy. 
The anti-seller makes and screens a movie starring your co-workers 
in which they explain why it’s a bad idea to buy.1 Although the law 
prohibits direct threats, the message underlying anti-seller’s adver-
tising campaign is that your employer may go out of business or be 
forced to lay you off if you buy the item. Meanwhile, the seller 
from whom you propose to buy has to work hard even to figure out 
who you are and where to reach you to speak with you. Unlike the 
anti-seller, the seller cannot speak with you during your working 
I 
 
* Douglas Blount Maggs Professor of Law, Duke University.
1 See Allegheny Ludlum Corp., 333 N.L.R.B. 734, 734 (2001) (describing union elec-
tion campaign in which employer made and screened a film of employees explaining 
why they opposed the union). 
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time, cannot email you at work, and can’t even leave a leaflet on 
the windshield of your car in the parking lot at work. If union rep-
resentation is sold in a market, as Professor Bodie suggests,2 that is 
what the market looks like.3 
Is this market a properly functioning one? The one thing that we 
can say about that market is that it is unlike any other market for 
the sale of goods or services that exists in America today.4 The 
usual problem with information is with sellers who have very good 
access to consumers and must be forced to provide accurate and 
material information in the market. In the union market, however, 
the seller has poor access to the consumer. Moreover, the problem 
is not just that workers get too little information or that unions as 
sellers mislead; it is that workers get a huge amount of information, 
some of it misleading, from an entity who is not the seller but who 
has an incentive to do everything possible to persuade them not to 
buy. In addition, unlike in most other markets, the anti-seller has 
the consumers as a captive audience all day each workday and an 
unparalleled ability to intimidate the buyer by indirectly threaten-
ing his or her job. Unless we accept the dubious contention that 
only unions are likely to exaggerate or mislead workers about un-
ionization, any genuinely effective regulation the market must deal 
both with the seller and the anti-seller when it comes to both the 
quantity and the quality of the information. 
It is an article of faith among lawyers and economists that infor-
mation is good. Perfect information is the gold standard in eco-
nomic analysis. The free market of ideas is the conventional justifi-
cation for free speech. A duty to provide information has great 
normative force. It’s like freedom or literacy or the benefits of play 
for young children—you can hardly find anyone who will argue 
2 Matthew T. Bodie, Information and the Market for Union Representation, 94 Va. 
L. Rev. 1 (2008). 
3 Employers might protest the characterization of them as the “anti-sellers,” instead 
preferring to describe themselves as competitors with the union in a market. But since 
only the union is selling representation services—the employer is presumably not sell-
ing itself as the employees agent in negotiating against itself—Professor Bodie seems 
correct in characterizing only the union as being a seller of services. 
4 Sellers of illegal or illicit products and services perhaps are analogous, but it is the 
rare employer that will devote as much time and money to persuading its employees 
not to gamble or consume illegal drugs as it does to persuading its employees not to 
vote for a union. Moreover, unlike the right to join a union, there is no statutory right 
to consume illegal drugs. 
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against it, and the halo surrounding the concept makes it hard to 
realistically access whether or when it really is as good as we think. 
That is particularly true when it comes to important decisions. Em-
ployee decisions whether to join a union and management deci-
sions whether or how strenuously to oppose unionization are 
enormously significant by almost any measure. Many studies show 
that unionization results in pay increases and a net transfer of 
wealth from shareholders to employees. Unionization typically re-
duces the ability of the firm arbitrarily to fire employees. Unioniza-
tion usually increases compliance with workplace safety and health 
laws. Given the importance of the decision and the normative ap-
peal of information, it seems obvious to suggest law should force 
full disclosure of information about it. 
The law regulating union elections does a terrible job of ensur-
ing full and fair disclosure of information to any of the people—
employees, managers, senior managers, customers, and sharehold-
ers—whose lives or wealth may be affected by the unionization of a 
group of employees. Indeed, the law of union elections finds few 
defenders at almost any point of the ideological spectrum (not 
even among those who make their living off its Byzantine complex-
ity). And, as Professor Bodie also points out, economics would 
suggest that the more workers will benefit (at the expense of man-
agement or shareholders) by unionization, the greater the incentive 
of management to oppose it. The hard question is what to do about 
information. Whole bodies of law exist to force disclosure of rele-
vant information, including in securities, real estate, insurance, 
banking, pharmaceutical and food labeling, and the informed con-
sent concept in medicine. What do these areas of law suggest about 
how a disclosure obligation would work in practice, and on whom 
the obligation would rest? 
In most other areas of law in which a consumer purchases goods 
or services, the law obligates the seller to disclose. Labor law, how-
ever, is more complicated. The provision of information involves 
two components: access and accuracy. The law gives the employer 
much better access to communicate with employees. Unions can-
not go on company property; employees cannot use working time 
to communicate with each other and cannot distribute literature at 
any time in working areas. Employers can prohibit unions and em-
ployees from using company email systems. The union cannot even 
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get the names and contact information of workers until it already 
enjoys substantial support among workers.5 When it comes to the 
substance of speech, although law treats the seller and the anti-
seller equally—there are few limits on truthfulness and none at all 
on its fairness, and short of promises and threats, anything goes6—
the equality is rather like that enjoyed by the poor of Paris.7 When 
the employer and union each render a prediction about whether 
unionization will result in the employer going out of business or 
laying off workers, the employer’s prediction has a whole different 
weight. 
The metaphor of the decision to choose a union as being a deci-
sion to purchase services in the market lends itself to thinking that 
the duty to disclose should rest on the union, because that is where 
law usually places disclosure obligations. If a duty of increased dis-
closure fell on the union, how would the union discharge that duty 
without equal access to employees? Many areas of law that require 
the seller to disclose allow the buyer either to rescind a transaction 
or to sue for damages if there is inadequate disclosure. How would 
such a rule be applied to unions? Could employees who opposed 
the union have a union certification set aside? Would there be an 
action for damages if the workers later concluded that they made 
an unwise choice in voting for a union? If part of the information 
problem is the inequality in access between employer and union, 
and the remedy is to impose a duty on employers too, should 
workers be able to set aside the election if the union lost? Or bring 
an action for damages against the employer that provided inaccu-
rate information? 
5 See Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 541 (1992) (holding that employer 
could bar nonemployee union organizers from soliciting employees on employer’s 
property); Farm Fresh, Inc., 326 N.L.R.B. 997, 1001–02 (1998) (finding that employers 
could exclude union agents from stores’ snack bar and sidewalks); Excelsior Under-
wear, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 1236, 1245 (1966) (observing that requirement that employ-
ers provide names and addresses of employees to union representatives “is limited to 
a situation in which employee interests in self-organization are shown to be substan-
tial”). 
6 See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 617 (1968); Midland Nat’l Life Ins. 
Co., 263 N.L.R.B. 127, 133 (1982). 
7 “[T]he majestic equality of the laws . . . forbid[s] rich and poor alike to sleep under 
the bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal their bread.” Anatole France, The Red 
Lily 91 (Winifred Stephens trans., Dodd, Mead & Co. 1924) (1894). 
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Depending on whether one thinks the main problem with the 
market for union services is inequality of access or the problematic 
content of information provided, one might propose different legal 
reforms. Any law aiming to reduce the quantity of information 
provided by firms is not realistic. First, such a law would require an 
amendment to Section 8(c) of the National Labor Relations Act 
(“NLRA”),8 and that is not likely to emerge from Congress until 
Democrats get both the White House and a filibuster-proof major-
ity of the Senate. Second, even if such legislation were enacted, any 
significant restriction on employer speech is likely to encounter a 
stiff First Amendment challenge in the Supreme Court. Reform is 
therefore more likely to come, if it comes at all, in the form of en-
hancing union access—as by legislatively overruling Lechmere9 and 
NLRB v. United Steelworkers (Nutone & Avondale).10 
But what about the content of the speech? There is no First 
Amendment right to mislead, so one could imagine a legislative 
change to Midland National Life Insurance Co.11 and maybe even a 
narrowing of the right to make menacing “predictions” that are 
currently allowed under Gissel.12 Absent equal access, however, no 
one would expect that changes to the content of union election 
speech would make much difference. Is it realistic to think that 
courts would uphold, even if Congress enacted, some sort of “fair-
ness doctrine” requiring employers to give unions equal time if 
they choose to run anti-union campaigns? The fact that the Court 
struck down the application of the fairness doctrine to newspapers 
does not bode well for such a rule in union elections.13 
One difficulty in designing appropriate legal rules to address 
whatever information problems exist is that the reasons for the in-
formation problems are different than the usual ones. Inadequate 
disclosure by unions, unlike inadequate disclosure by sellers of 
8 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (2000). 
9 Lechmere, 502 U.S. 527. 
10 NLRB v. United Steelworkers (Nutone & Avondale), 357 U.S. 357 (1958). 
11 Midland Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 275 N.L.R.B. 127 (1982). 
12 NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 620 (1969). 
13 Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974). The Court upheld 
the fairness doctrine as regards broadcast media in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. 
FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 400–01 (1968), on the grounds of the limited number of channels 
in the spectrum. It is hard to know whether the current Court would regard a work-
place as a limited resource or more like a newspaper, where there is no scarcity. 
 6 Virginia Law Review In Brief [Vol. 94:1 
 
other goods and services, is not simply a function of the seller’s 
self-interest. If there is any truth to the data showing that unioniza-
tion increases the wealth of workers at the expense of sharehold-
ers, most unions would be happy to provide more truthful informa-
tion to workers about what unions do for their members (they 
might also wish to provide misleadingly positive information too, 
of course). But even if unions were required to provide only mate-
rial and accurate information, they would encounter two problems 
in doing so. One is that law restricts their access and the second is a 
lack the resources. The information problem could be partially ad-
dressed by lowering the barriers to access. The law might say that 
any form of speech the employer chooses to engage in should be 
made available to the union: captive audience speeches, one-on-
one meetings at the workplace, email messages, films, etc. This 
would be a radical change in labor law, and I doubt it will happen 
until Democrats get a filibuster-proof majority in the Senate and 
occupy the White House. Even then, one wonders what it would 
take to get such a legal change through the inevitable legal chal-
lenges in federal courts. But assume that happened. Would unions 
take advantage of the opportunity for equal time? 
That raises the question of resources. Unions are nonprofits. 
Even the wealthiest union has less money than most large firms. 
Moreover, labor law limits the use of union dues for organizing. 
Unlike every other form of nonprofit organization, and unlike their 
corporate adversaries, unions are required by law (the duty of fair 
representation) to provide services to existing members and lim-
ited by law in spending revenues to sell their services to prospec-
tive buyers (i.e., to organize). Under some circumstances, employ-
ees represented by a union but who refuse to pay full dues can 
refuse to fund organizing, which requires unions to segregate their 
assets and devote toward organizing only the money raised from 
members who have not exercised their right to pay agency fees.14 
Employer associations are vigorously pushing for even greater re-
strictions on the ability of unions to raise and spend money to or-
14 See Teamsters Local 75, 349 N.L.R.B. No. 14, 4–6 (Jan. 26, 2007) (discussing when 
agency fee payers can be charged for costs in connection with organizing other em-
ployees). But see United Food & Commercial Workers Local 1036 v. NLRB, 307 F.3d 
760 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (finding that fee payers may be charged costs of organiz-
ing workers in the same competitive market). 
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ganize new workers.15 So the trend in the law is toward reducing, 
rather than increasing, union resources for information disclosure. 
Having long ago despaired of any significant legal change in the 
area of campaign speech, unions have decided that the only solu-
tion to one-sided and misleading employer speech is to shorten the 
selection process through card-check and eliminate misleading and 
covertly threatening speech through neutrality. Card check and 
neutrality are essentially prophylactic: if you can’t get equal 
speech, then just have less speech. I suspect that the National Right 
to Work Organization will seize on Professor Bodie’s article as 
vindication of their view that card-check and neutrality are bad be-
cause they silence speech. 
There is a very real risk that lawyers and courts will attend only 
to half of Professor Bodie’s argument. They may accept the con-
tention that information is important and that card-check and neu-
trality and the Board’s proposed new rule for expedited twenty-
eight-day election campaigns16 are bad because they limit informa-
tion in the union election process. But they may overlook the sub-
stantial information problems that already exist in the process. 
While Professor Bodie does an admirable job of explaining why in-
formation matters, the process will not be significantly improved if 
an argument for more information is taken as an argument to pro-
tect the status quo of misleading and one-sided information. 
 
15 Press Release, Nat’l Right to Work Legal Def. Found., Inc., Judge Strikes Down 
Nationwide UAW Union Policy Forcing Employees to Object Annually to Political 
Expenditures (March 6, 2008) (available at http://www.nrtw.org/press/2008/03) (not-
ing that the claim was filed “[w]ith free legal aid from the National Right to Work Le-
gal Defense Foundation”). 
16 Joint Petitions for Certification Consenting to an Election, 73 Fed. Reg. 10,199–
10,201 (Feb. 26, 2008) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 101 & 102) (Proposed rule 
would create a new petition that employers and unions could file jointly, after which 
an election would be held in 28 days or less. No showing of interest would be re-
quired.). 
